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THE NLRB AND ARBITRATION:
IS THE BOARD'S EXPANDING
JURISDICTION JUSTIFIED?
Richard I. Bloch *
i. Introduction
Resolution of unfair labor practice disputes is the business of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. Interpretation and enforcement of contract
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, however, are not. Such
matters are normally left to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators and the
courts. Recently, however, the NLRB has embarked upon a course which
has raised questions in the minds of many regarding the jurisdictional
boundaries the Board chooses to observe. The purpose of this paper is
to examine the jurisdictional problem which arises when a breach of con-
tract is also an unfair labor practice.
The trouble begins when a dispute arises over differing interpretations
of a contract provision. The union, for example, alleges that the employer
has made a unilateral change in the terms or conditions of employment.
The defense will be either that such change was specifically permitted by
the contract or that the union had waived its right to bargain over any
matters outside the realm of the bargaining agreement. The Board views
these cases as coming under Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
"refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of his employees." 1
On the other hand, were it not for the dispute over the contract provision's
interpretation, there would be no question of an unfair labor practice.
The provisions of the National Labor Relations Act overlap. Section
10(a) 2 clearly vests the Board with jurisdiction over any conduct involv-
ing a violation of Section 8, regardless of any contractually agreed upon
methods of settling the dispute. But Title III, Section 301 of the Act pro-
vides that suits for contract violations may be brought in Federal court.
3
*Mr. Bloch is a third-year law student at the University of Michigan Law School.
1National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
2 Section 10(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1965), provides:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in Section 8) affecting
commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of ad-
justment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement,
law, or otherwise.




Thus, while the Board has the power to interpret a contract provision, 4
conflicting statutory provisions provide for other methods of settlement and
raise the question as to when the Board should, in its discretion, defer
to these alternative routes.
This overlap in function of the statutory provisions elicits various policy
considerations. The nature of a settlement, for instance, may differ in
character according to whether an arbitrator handles it or whether it goes
to the Board. Time and money are vital considerations in the labor field,
where there is so often a dire economic need to settle quickly. In an area
where statutory and policy considerations overlap, an attempt at accom-
modation is bound to create uncertainty, and in spite of attempts to for-
mulate guidelines in resolving disputes which arise over the jurisdictional
questions, the area is still cloudy at best.
Neither legislative nor case history on the subject has been totally en-
lightening. Legislative history of the Act dealing with the nature of the
duty to bargain suggests that the Board has no jurisdiction over these
cases. Critics use the legislative history as a basis for accusing the Board
of rejecting national policy favoring arbitration, thereby allowing charging
parties to "use its processes for contract interpretation [and] permitting
them to circumvent contractual commitments to subject contractual dis-
putes to arbitration." 5 On the other side, supporters of Board policy in
taking jurisdiction over these cases point to Section 1 of the Act, which
states that it "is the purpose and policy of this Act . . . to provide orderly
and peaceful procedures" for settling disputes. In light of recent events
in the labor field, however, one cannot help but wonder if the NLRB is
not ignoring a most important distinction between the "providing" of or-
derly procedures and the policing of contractual commitments.
Since Lincoln Mills6 in 1957 and the later Steelworkers trilogy,7 the
Supreme Court has attempted to articulate the respective jurisdictions of
courts and arbitrators in relation to the collective bargaining agreement.
In those cases, the Court saw the need to strengthen the collective bar-
gaining process by giving full play to the private remedial machinery es-
tablished by the parties themselves. But this did not specifically establish
the boundaries of jurisdiction to be observed by the NLRB.
What are these boundaries? What is the effect of deciding to defer or
not to defer to arbitration? What standards does the Board employ when
4 In Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964) the Court held
that notwithstanding the availability of arbitration "The superior authority of the
Board may be invoked at any time," and that the Board "may disagree with the
arbiter" in which case the "Board's ruling would of course take precedence."
5 O'Brien, "Should the NLRB Arbitrate Labor Contract Disputes?" 6 WASHBURN
L. J. 39 (1966).
6 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
7 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593(1960).
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faced with the problem of contract interpretation? These are the questions
I shall examine. This article will view the functions of the arbitrator and
the Labor Board, as well as the arguments for their respective jurisdic-
tions. It will examine the history of the subject from Lincoln Mills through
the most recent words on the subject. With a view of the history of the
problem and an attempt to examine realistic solutions as well as pure legal
logic, the attempt will be to demonstrate the glaring need today for more
specifically enunciated standards on the part of the Board. I shall pro-
pose certain aspects of the collective bargaining situation to which the
Board must pay greater heed in forming its policy of deferral. Should
the NLRB continue to ignore the responsibility of forming clearer juris-
dictional boundaries, it will do so at the risk of undermining the strength
of the collective bargaining process itself.
H!. Functions of the Board and the Arbitrator
The chief distinction between the function of the Board and that of the
arbitrator lies in their differing jurisdictions. In Adams DairyS Board
Member Brown declared that:
. . . [Tihe function of the arbitrator rarely exceeds interpretation and
application of a particular provision of an existing agreement to a
particular dispute. 9
The arbitrator's duty is limited in that he must enforce existing rights only.
Where the parties have not yet reached agreement, the arbitrator would
normally have no power to act. Brown characterized arbitration as "retro-
spective in nature," concerned as it is with the interpretation of existing
agreements. This, he pointed out, was to be distinguished from that phase
of collective bargaining concerned with "the creation of new rights or the
modification of existing rights."1o
Thus, in administering Section 8(a) (5), the Board's function is quite
different from the arbitrator's since the Board's concern is that terms
and conditions of employment are established as a result of agree-
ment reached through collective bargaining, and not with the inter-
pretation or application of agreements already achieved. 1
What does this phrase "interpretation of agreements" mean? If the
Board were never able to construe a contract provision, it is conceivable
s Cloverleaf Division of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964). [Hereinafter
cited as Adams Dairy]





that it could never decide whether or not to take jurisdiction of a case.' 2
The Board has repeatedly held that merely because it is forced to inter-
pret a contract clause as incidental to the resolution of an unfair labor
practice, even though this clause is concededly within the scope of arbi-
tration, this alone will not preclude Board jurisdiction.1 3 The question is
when it will indulge in this process of interpretation. The answer lies
somewhere between the one extreme of never touching a matter which
could be classified as contractual in form, and the other of always exer-
cising jurisdiction because the case involves, no matter how tangentially,
an unfair labor practice. For, as mentioned above, the power to prevent
unfair labor practices has been granted the Board under Section 10(a)
of the Act, which provides that it can proceed regardless of "any other
means of adjustment or prevention that has been established by agree-
ment, law, or otherwise." It must be remembered that the Board repre-
sents public interests in the capacity of a public agency. Its power is
supreme and it is "not just an umpire to referee a game between an
employer and a union."14
An arbitrator, on the other hand, determines "private rights and pri-
vate duties stemming from a private contract."1 5 He is an employee of
the parties and must reach a conclusion satisfactory to both sides, lest (1)
industrial strife remain and (2) he find himself unemployed during future
disputes. His function is limited. It is generally admitted that he need
interpret only the contract itself, and question only whether the terms
agreed upon were obeyed. It is not his concern if performance according
to the terms would constitute outright unfair labor practices; this is the
Board's problem. 1 6
12 It is evident that the power to interpret the contractual relationship of the parties
must be granted the Board, lest there be no means for deciding whether to defer
to arbitration or to process the unfair labor case. Were this not the case, there
would be only an arbitrary choice between deferring or not, and the statutory
policies of the Act would be thwarted through its own provisions.
'3 Adams Dairy ; Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1964); Huttig Sash
and Door Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 811 (1965); Century Papers Inc., 155 N.L.R.B.
358 (1965); C & S Industries, 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966).
14 Address by Mr. Arnold Ordman, Academy of Arbitrators, March 3, 1967, Arbitra-
tion and the N.L.R.B. - A Second Look, 64 LAB. REL. REP. 213, citing Shore-
line Enterprises v. NLRB, 262 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1959).
15 Id. at 213.
16 One writer expresses the arbitrator's function this way:
A proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic. He is not a public
tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties
are obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer justice for a
community which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a system ol
self-government created by and confined to the parties. He serves theii
pleasure only, to administer the rule of law established by their collective
agreement. They are entitled to demand that, at least or balance, his per-
formance be satisfactory to them, and they can readily dispense with hirr
if it is not.
Schulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV
999, 1016 (1955).
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Given that there are alternative -public and private- routes toward
settlement, which will control? When will the Board defer to the arbitral
process, and why? The Board has the discretion to defer or not; thus, it
must be the Board's decision, and it is the Board's duty, to formulate
guidelines by which it will be able best to fulfill its responsibilities to the
parties and to the public. As stated by General Counsel Ordman, 17 the
process is one of extending hospitality to the arbitration process without
abdicating statutory responsibilities.
Accommodation
The above-mentioned process, an attempt to reconcile any conflict be-
tween Board and arbitration proceedings, to accommodate the overlapping
procedures, is the key to the problem. In order to avoid circumvention
of the arbitral process by the parties, the Board must, of course, steer
clear of doing the work of the arbitrators. is When we raise questions as
to when the Board should deal with unfair labor practices in a given case
and when it should relegate the parties to their contractual remedies, we
really ask: Should arbitration be a prerequisite to a party's rights under
an agreement? In other words, should a party be forced to go to arbitra-
tion first, if such avenue is provided in the collective bargaining agree-
ment?
The 1960 opinion in the landmark Steelworkers trilogy' 9 laid down guide-
lines for the respective roles of courts and arbitrators by providing that
unless the parties expressly provide otherwise, then determination of ar-
bitrability rests with the courts. This function is a limited one. The courts
may determine only whether a party seeking arbitration is making a claim
that on its face is governed by the contract. The arbitrators decide the
merits of the question. As we shall later see, there is a nice question as
to whether the arbitrator's relationship to the courts is the same as his
relationship to the Board. Regardless of this, however, the policy remains
as stated in the trilogy, and the attempt must be, as Board Member
Brown says, to "implement the philosophy which underlies the Supreme
Court's decision in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills
of Alabama and the Steelworkers trilogy of strengthening collective bar-
gaining by giving full play to the private adjustment machinery estab-
lished by the parties." 2 0
Against such a policy is the check imposed by Section 10(a), giving
ultimate jurisdiction to the Board over conduct violative of Section 8.21
17 See note 14 supra.
18 Nor, of course, should arbitration begin to do the work of the NLRB and the
courts. See Seitz, The Limits of Arbitration, comments in 88 U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review 762.
19 Note 7 supra.
20 Adams Dairy at 1421 (concurring opinion).
21 See note 2 supra.
Prospectus
Indeed, until Smith v. The Evening News 22 it was not clear that a court
could even hear a contract case involving an unfair labor practice.
Given the choice of routes, 23 the problem is complicated by the fact
that neither is mutually exclusive. It is even possible for a party to at-
tempt to engage in arbitration while at the same time having filed an un-
fair labor practice charge with the Board. 24 Of this practice, Member
Brown said:
I believe that it is inconsistent with the statutory policy favoring ar-
bitration for the Board to resolve disputes which, while cast as unfair
labor practices, essentially involve a dispute with respect to the inter-
pretation or application of the collective bargaining agreement.2 5
The problem, of course, is to make that decision as to whether or not the
dispute is indeed one with respect to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining process. Professor Sovern points out that an imagi-
native litigant may readily exploit the possibilities of fabricating unfair
labor practices to defeat or delay contract actions.2 6 On the other hand,
however, respondents in the unfair labor practice cases may construct
"contract actions" in order to defeat the exercise of rights guaranteed by
the National Labor Relations Act.
The Arbitration Clause: A "Waiver"?
What is the effect of an arbitration clause in a contract? Is it merely
an alternative, or should parties be forced to abide by their private, mu-
tually agreed upon machinery? In United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company,27 the Supreme Court took a
stance heavily in favor of arbitration. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice
Douglas said:
[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required
to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit. Yet, to be consistent with Congressional policy in favor of
settlement of disputes by the parties through the machinery of arbi-
22 371 U.S. 195 (1962). It was held here that a court could hear a suit on a contract
or compel arbitration or affirm an arbitration award by virtue of Section 301,
even though the alleged breach of contract was also arguably an unfair labor
practice. The Supreme Court held that the pre-emption doctrine did not go so
far as to preclude contract actions on grievances which were arguably unfair
labor practices, but neither did it say that the private agreement of the parties
pre-empted the Board's jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice.2 3 See note 4 supra.
24 See NLRB v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 324 F.2d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1963).
25 Adams Dairy at 1423 (concurring opinion).
26 Sovern, Section 301 & the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REV.
529 (1963).
27 363 U.S. 574.
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tration, the judicial inquiry under §301 must be strictly confined to
the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the
grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator power to make the
award he made. An order to arbitrate should not be denied unless
it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
28
This expansive approach by the Court raises the question of whether the
mere inclusion of such a clause will constitute a waiver of the parties'
rights to go before the Board. Board Member Brown's concurring opin-
ion in Adams Dairy states his views on the subject. In this case, the
Board had held that it would take jurisdiction of the case, regardless of
the presence of an arbitration clause in the contract. Brown concurred
insofar as he agreed that a case should not be dismissed merely because
the dispute could arguably have been subjected to arbitration. Said Brown:
Such action would be contrary to the principles of Spielberg, which
although limiting the scope of the Board inquiry, nevertheless estab-
lishes the principle that the Board has the duty where a statutory
right is involved to examine the fairness of the arbitration proceed-
ings and determine whether the results are repugnant to the Act.
Since we cannot predict whether a yet to be held arbitration proceed-
ing will comply with Spielberg standards we should withhold our
action pending the arbitrator's award. (See Dubo Manufacturing
Company, 142 NLRB 431.) If, after an award has been rendered
there is a request for Board action, our consideration of the case
would be controlled by Spielberg.29
Brown here expresses the view that the Board should look to the bargain-
ing history, to past practice, and to the express terms of the contract 3 0
2 8 ld. at 582.
29 Adams Dairy at 1423 (concurring opinion).
30In Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1964), it was held that the em-
ployer's unilateral action in establishing a second shift constituted an unlawful
refusal to bargain with the union where the employer took such action with full
knowledge of the union's objection to his unilateral action and the union had
asserted its rights and desire to bargain about such matters.
The Board further rejected employer's contention that the dispute should be
resolved through the grievance procedure rather than being adjudicated by the
Board because the contract defined a grievance as a "difference between the Com-
pany and the union as to the meaning or application of the provisions of the
agreement." (Italics added) The dispute before the Board was not one which
grew out of misunderstanding over the terms of the contract. Instead, the com-
plaint was directed at, and sought redress for, a denial of a statutory right guar-
anteed by the Act-the right of a union to bargain about terms and conditions of
employment. The Board felt that to dismiss the complaint and defer to arbitration
would have amounted to an abdication of its responsibilities under the Act.
April 1968]
Prospectus
to insure performance of the agreement, if possible. If either party's
rights have been expressly bargained away, or in some way have been
allowed to lapse in past practice, then it would be essential, in Brown's
view, for the Board to defer to the arbitrator questions of interpretation
and application of the contract.
Brown's theories are not the Board's guidelines. The most recent
actions of the Board pay little, if any, attention to this absolutely vital
area of past practice and bargaining history. The question of the effect
of an arbitration clause upon a contract is, naturally, the core of the
many problems of accommodation, and it is this area which is the most
undefined and vague. According to Member Brown, the presence of an
arbitration clause should not be controlling on the question of whether
to go to arbitration. This is not to imply that parties should have a choice
of whether or not to go to arbitration. Rather, it means that the Board
need not be controlled and forestalled by the presence of the clause alone.
Conversely, one suspects, the absence of such a clause should not imme-
diately vest the Board with jurisdiction to interpret the contract provisions
of an agreement. Such reasoning is not mere symmetry, but instead
adheres to the statutorily expressed desire for flexibility in dealing with
labor disputes. 31
Having examined the functions and jurisdictions of the Board and the
arbitrators, and the problem of the arbitration clause and the "waiver",
I now turn to the cases themselves in order to examine some of the
"solutions" to the problems raised.
111. The Labor Board and the Collective Bargaining Contract
It is perhaps helpful to reiterate at this point that the relationship
involved here is not that of the Labor Board to the arbitrators, but rather
of the Board to the contract itself. Because the Board has the final and
supreme power, the question is how it will treat the arbitration clause,
or lack of such, in the contract. The focus must be on the power and
concomitant discretion of the Board.
The Policy of Abstention
"Analytically and ideally," said Arnold Ordman, "the unfair labor prac-
tice function should be a subordinate activity to be utilized only where the
free choice of representatives and the free play of collective bargaining
have been frustrated by improper conduct of the parties." 3 2 This remark
31 See article by Bernard Cushman, Special Assistant to the General Counsel of the
NLRB, entitled Arbitration and the Duty to Bargain, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 612,
wherein the author discusses, among other things, the need for more concern
with factors such as bargaining history of the parties in determining the question
of Board jurisdiction.
32 Address by Mr. Ordman, National Academy of Arbitrators, March 2, 1967, 64
LAB. REL. REP. 232.
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by the NLRB General Counsel restates the theme of Section 1 of the Act
that disputes should be settled peacefully with "practices fundamental to
the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences
as to wages, hours, or other working conditions . . . " Moreover, the
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act shows Congressional intent to
deny the Board jurisdiction over labor contract disputes. In discussing
the Act, it was proposed that all breaches of labor agreements be made
unfair labor practices, thus, within Board jurisdiction. Congress, however,
rejected this proposal. The Joint Committee Report explained that its
rejection was based upon its wish to leave the enforcement of labor agree-
ments to "the usual processes of law and not to the National Labor
Relations Board." 33 Congress then gave Federal courts jurisdiction under
Section 301 to entertain suits arising out of breaches of labor contracts.
3 4
Finally, Congress passed Section 203(d),35 which declares that privately
agreed-upon methods of settlement should be favored, the attempt being
to restrict administrative supervision of bargaining as much as possible.
In looking to the limitations on the obligation to bargain, and, conse-
quently, on the Board's role in the enforcement of this obligation, Senator
Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Education and Labor Committee said
in 1935:
Where the employees have chosen their organization, when they have
selected their representative, all the Bill proposes to do is to escort
them to the door of their employer and say: 'Here, they are the legal
representatives of your employees.' What happens behind those doors
is not inquired into.3 6
The Senate Committee Report made a similar statement, reflecting a
desire to leave the parties room to arrive at their own bargains. It further
stated the Committee's intent that the Board not concern itself with inter-
preting or enforcing the terms of private agreements:
The Committee wishes to dispel any possible false impression that
the Bill is designed to compel the making of agreements or to permit
governmental supervision of their terms.
3 7
In the legislative history, then, are the roots of a national policy favor-
ing arbitration. But if in theory the unfair labor practice procedure should
33House Conf. Rep., No. 510 on H.R. 3020, p. 42; I LEGIs. HIST. L.M.R.A. 546
(1947).
34 Note 3 supra. In the Lincoln Mills case, supra note 6, the Supreme Court inter-
preted Title I1, which allows suits to be filed by and against labor organizations,
so as to conclude that a federal law must be fashioned to solve the problems
arising under Section 301.
35 LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT (Taft-Hartley Act), § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. §
173(d) (1965).
3611 LEGIs. HIST. N.L.R.A. 2373 (1935).
37 Rep: No. 573 on S. 1958; I LEGIS. HIST. L.M.R.A. 545-46 (1947).
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be secondary to the arbitral process, in actuality it is doubtful that it is.
Case history supports the belief that the Board is exceeding the juris-
dictional boundaries imposed upon it by Congress.3 8 There is no doubt,
however, that the Board has changed its tune from its previous acceptance
of a national policy favoring arbitration. Critics of Board policy look back
with fondness to cases such as United Telephone Company of the West,3 9
wherein the Board clearly exhibited more of a "hands-off" attitude. The
agreement involved in that case specified that all wage rates, working
schedules and employee privileges would remain unchanged during the
life of the agreement. The work hours of certain employees were sub-
sequently diminished, and the union demanded arbitration on the basis of
an arbitration clause in the contract. Refusing to submit to arbitration,
the company suggested a declaratory suit to determine whether it was
precluded by contract from making the reduction. The union rejected this
and charged the company with a refusal to bargain based on its refusing
to submit to arbitration. The Board declined jurisdiction over the alleged
unfair labor practice because any ruling it might have made would have
been based strictly on contract interpretation.
In International Harvester Co.,40 the Board refused to exercise its juris-
diction, employing Spielberg-type standards in holding that the award was
not "palpably wrong" and contained "no serious procedural infirmities." 4 1
While stating that Section 10 (a) gave it jurisdiction, the Board held that:
. . . it is equally well established that the Board has considerable
38 It must be admitted that there are some questions as to the true meaning and
application of legislative history to the individual cases. One critic of the present
Board contends that the Supreme Court's declaration in American Manufacturing
(note 7 supra) that federal courts should refrain from ruling on the merits of
a contract dispute and allow arbitration full play, is "perforce applicable" to the
Board as well as the courts. (O'Brien, supra note 5.) It is not. Indeed, in NLRB
v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967), the Court expressly denied the ap-
plicability of such standards to the Board because the Board has powers under
Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) which do not apply to the courts under Section 301:
Section 8(a)(5) proscribes failure to bargain collectively in only the most
general terms, but Section 8(d) amplifies it by defining "to bargain col-
lectively" as including "the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to . . . any questions arising [under an agreement].
(385 U.S. at 436).
Referring finally to the liberal provisions of Section 10(a), the Court concluded
that "to view the Steelworkers decisions as automatically requiring the Board
in this case to defer to the primary determination of an arbitrator" would be
"to overlook important distinctions between those cases and this one." (385 U.S.
at 437).
39 112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955).
40 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962). Here, the union demanded the discharge of an employee
under a valid union security agreement. When the employer refused to comply
with the demand, the parties went to arbitration, and the subsequent award
directed reduced seniority rather than layoff.
41 id. at 928-29.
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discretion to respect an arbitration award and decline to exercise its
authority over alleged unfair labor practices if to do so will serve
the fundamental aims of the Act.42
Stating that the Act is primarily designed to promote industrial peace
through collective bargaining, the Board cited the Warrior and Gulf case
as experience showing that contracts containing arbitration provisions " 'as
a substitute for industrial strife' contribute significantly to the attainment
of this statutory objective." 4 3 The case itself presents no analytical prob-
lems. Those cases wherein an arbitration award has already been
rendered are, since Spielberg,44 the easy cases. Important here is the fact
that the Board ignores any distinction between the relationship of the
Board to the courts and the Board to the arbitrators. Indeed, in deferring
to arbitration, the Board effectively aligns itself with the courts. Citing the
Supreme Court's admonition to the lower courts in the Steelworkers cases
to refrain from passing on the merits of the grievances in determining the
question of arbitrability in Section 301 suits, the Board states:
If complete effectuation of the Federal policy is to be achieved, we
firmly believe that the Board, which is entrusted with the adminis-
tration of one of the many facets of national labor policy, should give
hospitable acceptance to the arbitral process as 'part and parcel of
the collective bargaining process itself,' [citing Warrior and Gulf at
578] and voluntarily withhold its undoubted authority to adjudicate
alleged unfair labor practice charges involving the same subject
matter, unless it clearly appears that the arbitration proceedings
were tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness, or serious procedural
infirmities or that the award was clearly repugnant to the purpose
and policies of the Act. . . .45
In Century Papers, Inc.,46 the Board took the opposite tack, refusing
to give "hospitable acceptance" to the arbitration process. Instead, it
exercised its jurisdiction over the case. Here, there was a grievance
procedure which included an arbitration clause, but after having initiated
a grievance regarding a unilateral wage increase by the employer, the union
abandoned the grievance procedure and filed an unfair labor practice
charge rather than appealing to arbitration. Replying to the employer's
contention that the dispute involved a breach of contract which should
go to arbitration, the Board pointed out that the contract provisions were
"plain and unambiguous" and not reasonably susceptible to the com-
pany's interpretation that it was free to unilaterally change the wage rates.
42 Id. at 925-26.
43 Id. at 926.
44 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
45 International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 927 (1962).
46 155 N.L.R.B. 358 (1965).
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The Board, therefore, decided that the dispute was not "within the exclu-
sive province of an arbitrator." 4 7 How does one reconcile such a decision
with the Board's policy of refraining from policing contracts, as stated in
United Telephone?48 Given an unambiguous contract provision and an
arbitration clause, there is no reason why an arbitrator could not have
fashioned a remedy. Yet, the Board seems to say in Century Papers that
because the provision is unambiguous, the breach of such must have been
in bad faith, and thus Board jurisdiction is warranted. In order to resolve
the seeming conflict, it is necessary to look to the nature of the Board's
role in each case.
Before granting relief in United Telephone, the Board would have had
first to determine the meaning of an individual clause in the labor contract,
and then to decide whether the refusal to go to arbitration was con-
sequently a refusal to bargain. In Century Papers, though, there was no
necessity for the Board to make a binding construction of the agreement.
The Board stated that the terms were unambiguous. It may be noted
that even this judgement implies some "interpretation", but it is evident
that the Board must be granted some threshold powers of interpretation
lest it be unable to function at al1.4 9 The key question remains: How
far will the Board go in exercising these interpretive powers when faced
with specific contractual clauses? There can be no stock formula; each
case presents a different perspective, and factors such as the express terms
of the contract, the availability of help under arbitration, and the prob-
ability of a successful cure under one method or the other will influence
the decision.
Forming Guidelines - Adams Dairy
In deciding the Adams Dairy50 case in 1964, the Board formulated
guidelines, both in the opinion of the majority and in the concurring
opinion of Member Brown, which provide an effective background against
which more recent cases may be held up for examination. Adams Dairy
involved a substantial change in working conditions unilaterally instituted
by the employer. Specifically, the employer subcontracted a significant
portion of work which, while not resulting in the dismissal of employees,
did create a matter of "legitimate concern to the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees." 5 1 The contract provided for arbitration
in the event of a dispute concerning the application or interpretation of
the terms of the agreement. The Board held, however, that such a clause
did not constitute a waiver of statutory rights by the union, for such
47 Id. at 361.
48 See p. 98 supra.
4 9 See pp. 91-92 supra.
50 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).
51 Id. at 1412.
[Vol. 1: 1
NLRB Arbitration Jurisdiction
waiver was not clearly expressed in the contract, and was not "lightly to
be inferred." 5 2 Said the Board:
The evidence upon which the Respondent relies falls short of that
requisite standard of proof and is insufficient in our opinion to estab-
lish union acquiescence in Respondent's assertion of a contractual
right to undertake the disputed unilateral action.
53
In bargaining with the employer, the union had attempted unsuccessfully
to include in the contract (1) a right to veto any decision to change
working conditions and (2) a statement of its statutory right to
bargain over the institution of such changes. The Board held that the
union's lack of success did not constitute a waiver of its rights, and that
the employer was therefore not justified in instituting the changes.
In assuming jurisdiction over the case, the Board characterized the
dispute as one concerning "statutory obligations." The arbitration clause,
it pointed out, related only to a dispute over the terms of the agree-
ment.54 Since this complaint did not relate to the meaning of any estab-
lished term or condition of the contract, it was matter for the Board. The
right to be notified and consulted in advance, and to be given an oppor-
tunity to bargain about changes not covered by contract, said the Board,
was a right guaranteed by Section 8(d) of the Act.
The Board based its jurisdiction on the fact that the dispute was
"basically" a statutory problem rather than a contractual one. Having
made this determination the Board expressed the view that the presence
of a question of contract interpretation could not deprive it of jurisdiction:
We are not unmindful of the fact that the resolution of the unfair
labor practice issue in this case has required our consideration, as a
subsidiary issue, of the Respondent's claim that it was impliedly
authorized under the contract to take unilateral action on the matters
complained of-a claim we have rejected as without merit. We may
assume that this claim gave rise to a difference over the meaning of
contractual provisions that might have been submitted for . . . arbi-
tration procedures. Nevertheless, we do not consider that reason
enough for us to refuse to entertain the instant unfair labor practice
proceeding, or to provide the necessary redress for the violation
found. It is quite clear that the Board is not precluded from resolving
an unfair labor practice issue, which may call for appropriate relief
under the Act, simply because as an incident to such violation, it may
be necessary to construe the scope of a contract which an arbitrator




54 See Hyde's Super Market, note 60 infra.
55 Adams Dairy at 1415.
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These are strong words. Taken alone, the Board's statement places no
restrictions on contract interpretation when an unfair labor practice is
involved. This statement seems to indicate that the Board views as un-
limited the power granted to it by Section 10 (a).
Yet, each case must stand alone, and there are other factors in Adams
Dairy which must be considered as having influenced the Board's position.
First, there was no arbitration award, nor had the parties attempted to
seek any. Secondly, this was not a case, said the Board, where the
existence of an alleged unfair labor practice turned primarily on an inter-
pretation of specific contractual provisions, "unquestionably encompassed
by the contract's arbitration provisions", and which came before the
Board in a context that made it "reasonably probable that arbitration
settlement of the contract dispute would also put at rest the unfair labor
practice controversy in a manner sufficient to effectuate the policies of the
Act."
5 6
The decision to assert jurisdiction was also based on a pragmatic con-
sideration. "It is highly conjectural," said the Board, "that arbitration in
this case, even if resorted to by the union, could have effectively disposed
of the basic issue in this case-whether Respondent acted lawfully in en-
gaging in the unilateral actions to which the instant complaint is
addressed." 57 The Board referred to a history of futile arbitration between
the parties and assumed on that basis that, the issues being the same, it
would again be futile.
In asserting jurisdiction, however, the Board reaffirmed its desire to
abstain from policing of collective agreements. It cited guidelines for
deciding whether to defer to arbitration, thus attempting to avoid any
possibility of "policing." In summary, the majority indicated that it would
refuse to assert jurisdiction when:
1. The case turns primarily on the interpretation of a specific contract
provision.
2. The disputed issue is unquestionably encompassed by the contract's
arbitration provision.
3. It is reasonably probable that an arbitration decision would also put
to rest the unfair labor practice controversy in a manner sufficient
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Board Member Brown did not agree entirely with the majority opinion.
He concurred in the result only insofar as there was no bargaining history
to show that the parties specifically wished to go to arbitration over this
type of dispute. Fearful, however, that by handling too many cases
involving arbitration clauses the Board would destroy the effectiveness of
such provisions, Brown referred to the policy expressed in Lincoln Mills
56 Id. at 1416 n.16. The Board stated that were those to be the circumstances, "clearly
not present here," deferral of Board action might most appropriately be con-
sidered. Cf. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951); Consolidated
Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943).
57 Adams Dairy at 1416.
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and in the Steelworkers trilogy and warned against the possible under-
mining of the arbitral process. In his view, the private agreement has
a high priority, and only where the parties have not by "practice, bargain-
ing history, or contract resolved their respective rights and obligations
with respect to the subject matter of the dispute" 58 should the Board
handle the case. Brown warned that while the mere presence of an
arbitration clause should not be equated to an automatic waiver of
statutory rights, it is the Board's duty to promote a high degree of respon-
sibility among the parties to a contract by having them settle according to
the methods incorporated into the agreement.
After Adams
Litigation since Adams Dairy has not been elucidating. In Crescent
Bed Co.59 the Board held that it, as well as a Federal court, could order
enforcement of an existing contract which an employer refused to honor,
where an enforcement order is an appropriate remedy for such an unlaw-
ful refusal to bargain. The Board, however, held that it was not within
its jurisdiction to construe specific provisions of the contract, and that if
this were necessary it should be accomplished through the grievance-
arbitration clause in the contract. This holding comported with its earlier
decision in Hyde's Super Market.6o
58 Id. at 1423.
59 157 N.L.R.B. 296 (1966). In this case, the charging union had brought suit against
the respondent under Section 301 in a federal district court as well as filing an
unfair labor practice charge before the Board. In this manner, it hoped to obtain
a statutory remedy before the Board in the form of a bargaining order, and a
contractual remedy from the court. Respondent argued that the basic issue was
whether there was a binding contract in effect, and that this was a matter for
the court to decide. The Board held that the true question was whether certain
conduct by the union justified the respondent in repudiating the contract or in
considering it mutually rescinded. The Board further held that this was a question
which they were as competent as a court to decide, since it underlies and is
directly relevant to the statutory violation of 8(a) (5) which was violated through
respondent's refusal to honor the contract after a certain date.
601d. at 298-99. In Hyde's Super Market, 145 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1964), the NLRB
modified a trial examiner's order which provided that the employer should
"comply with the provisions" of the contract, by stating instead that he should
"honor" the agreement. The Board said:
Where an employer refuses to sign a contract which has been previously
agreed upon, the Board has traditionally ordered his signature upon request.
Here, the contract was signed by respondent. The unfair labor practice here
consisted of respondent's later repudiation of, and refusal to honor, the
contract and recognize the union. Were we to adopt respondent's further
contention and reject the trial examiner's recommendation that respondent
"honor" the agreement, we would be failing adequately to remedy the unfair
labor practice. Accordingly, while not attempting to indicate the proper
interpretation of the individual terms of the contract, we believe that the
respondent's duty to recognize the union and to honor the agreement is




Referring to the respective roles of the Board and the arbitrators, the
Board said, "it is not for the Board to construe the full meaning or effect
of the contractual provisions by which Respondent was permitted to make
unilateral changes in incentive rates, and which has given rise to this
proceeding." 6 t Instead, the Board said that the parties are free to pursue
their respective contentions as to the proper interpretation of the provision
under their privately established machinery. In terms of the Acme Indus-
trial rationale, 6 2 this was simply a threshold determination that a contract
did exist. In light of the Adams Dairy standards, there was no reason
to decline jurisdiction, for the case before the Board did not involve solely
the question of specific contract clause interpretation.
In C & S Industries,63 the contract contained a provision stating that
"there shall be no change in the method of payment of any employee
covered by this agreement without prior negotiation and written consent
of the union." 6 4 The Board gave several reasons for taking jurisdiction of
the case, the first of which was that employed earlier in Century Papers.65
The Board held that the pertinent language of the contract was clear
and unambiguous and that it, therefore, did not fall within the "special
competence of an arbitrator to determine" whether the contract prohibited
the employer's unilateral installation of a wage plan. Next, citing Adams
Dairy, the Board held that it was not reasonably probable that an arbi-
trator could fashion an award sufficient to "put the statutory infringement
finally at rest in a manner sufficient to effectuate the policies of the
Act."66 Citing Section 10(a) of the Act, the Board said that it was "not
precluded from resolving an unfair labor practice issue calling for appro-
priate relief under the Act, simply because as an incident thereto it may
be necessary to construe the scope of a contract" which an arbitrator
could also have construed. 67
The opinion applies the guidelines established in Adams Dairy and
appears to construct a strong basis upon which to justify Board juris-
diction. Yet, one cannot help but question the meaning of putting the
infringement to rest in a manner "sufficient to effectuate the policies of
the Act." The Board order was to rescind the unilaterally-instituted
incentive plan and to cease and desist from instituting changes in the
wage-hour rates. This could have been accomplished by an arbitrator.
In factually similar cases, arbitrators have imposed remedies requiring dis-
establishment of unilaterally-instituted wage plans which were inconsistent
611d. at 299, citing United Tel. Co. of the West, 112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955); Morton
Salt Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1958); National Dairy Products Corp., 126
N.L.R.B. 434 (1960).
62 See p. 106 infra.
63 C & S Industries, 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966). [Hereinafter cited as C & SI
64 Id.
65 See note 46 supra.
66 C & S, supra note 63 at 460.
67 Id. at 459.
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with contract wage provisions and have gone so far as to award back pay
to employees whose earnings were cut by the use of the modified plans.6S
One must assume from the opinion that the Board decided against de-
ferral, recognizing that while the arbitrator can fashion the same remedy
as the Board, he need not do so. The decision implies that Member
Brown's theories as expressed in Adams Dairy will remain secondary
considerations as far as the Board is concerned, for C & S Industries is a
case wherein Brown would have the dispute go to arbitration. Admitting
that the issue was not "essentially" a contract dispute, and that the
resolution of the unfair labor practice does not turn specifically on a con-
tract provision, still this was a case that could have been handled under
arbitration, that indeed could have been put at rest in a manner sufficient
to effectuate the policies of the Act. If the Board in C & S Industries has
said that the arbitrator, in order to handle the case, must fashion a remedy
not only equal, but superior, to the Board's, then it is adding another
dimension to the jurisdictional problem, and the policy first expressed in
Lincoln Mills, dictating that Board jurisdiction should be exercised spar-
ingly, is being forsaken.
IV. Today's "Answers"
The cases discussed above make it clear that the Board conceives its
jurisdiction as extending into the area of contract interpretation and into
the enforcement of rights not specifically guaranteed by statute. The
cases exhibit a variety of guidelines and approaches so far as Labor Board
jurisdiction is concerned, from the "hands-off" attitude of United Telephone
to the strict control evidenced by the Board in C & S Industries.
Neither the law nor the policy considerations behind the Board's juris-
dictional decisions is clear, interwoven as they are with a plethora of
variables. However, in 1967 three cases were handed down-two from
the Supreme Court and one from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals-
which may provide a checklist of clues for determining Board action in
the future. Acme Industrial6 9 and C & C Plywood,70 handed down the
same day by the Supreme Court, and Huttig Sash & Door7 l represent the
latest efforts to deal with the jurisdictional conflict. These three cases
lean heavily on one another, and the approach taken in each serves to
highlight the jurisdictional problem as well as present possible solutions to
it. It is to these cases that I now turn my attention.
6SSee International Harvester Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 414 (1949) (McCoy, Arbitrator);
A. Henkel Mfg. Corp., 15 Lab. Arb. 81 (1950) (Healy, Arbitrator); Inter-
national Harvester Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 124 (1953) (Cole, Arbitrator); Bucyrus-
Erie Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 193 (1962) (Marshall, Arbitrator).
69 NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
7ONLRB v. C&C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967) [Hereinafter cited as C&C
Plywood]




Acme Industria7 2 follows the philosophy of Carey v. Westinghouse,
7 3
wherein it was stated that the availability of arbitration for resolving an
issue does not displace the Board's power to adjudicate the same issue
but is only a factor in considering the question of deferral. In Acme,
the Board issued an order to the employer to furnish the union with
information needed for determining if the collective bargaining agreement
had been violated. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused
to enforce the order, ruling that the existence of a binding arbitration
clause foreclosed the Board from exercising its statutory jurisdiction. The
court cited the Steelworker trilogy as articulating a national labor policy
favoring arbitration, thus requiring the Board's deferral to arbitration when
construction and application of the labor agreement itself are in issue.74
The Supreme Court reversed. The court denied the applicability of the
Steelworkers trilogy to a situation involving the Board's, rather than the
courts', relationship to the arbitrator,7 5 and in so doing, recognized the
very distinction ignored by the Board in International Harvester Co.
Admitting for the moment, however, that the policy of the Steelworkers
cases was thought to apply to the Board as it does to the courts, "that
policy," said the Supreme Court, "would not require the Board to abstain
here." 76
For when it ordered the employer to furnish the requested informa-
tion to the union, the Board was not making a binding construction
of the labor contract.77
According to the Court, the Board was here acting upon a simple
discovery-type standard, and was deciding nothing about the merits of
the case. The Court characterized the Board's action as a "threshold
determination" 7 8 of the potential relevance of the information. This, it
said, would in no way threaten the power which the parties had given
the arbitrator to make binding interpretations of the labor agreement, for
even should it appear that the subcontracting had occurred, the arbitrator
could still rule that there had been no breach of contract because no
workers had been laid off.
The structure of this case is important. The case turned primarily on
the interpretation of a specific contract provision, regardless of the
Supreme Court's characterization of it as a "threshold determination".
72 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
73375 U.S. 261 (1964).
74 385 U.S. at 435. See also p. 3 supra.
75 Id. at 436.
76 Id. at 437.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 438.
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Furthermore, the disputed issue was encompassed by the contract's arbi-
tration provision, and there is no doubt that an arbitrator as well as the
Board could have settled the case by issuing an order to supply the
information.
The Court justified the Board's exercise of jurisdictional powers by
claiming that it aided the arbitral process:
Far from intruding upon the preserve of the arbitrator, the Board's
action was in the aid of the arbitral process. Arbitration can func-
tion properly only if the grievance procedures leading to it can sift
out unmeritorious claims. For if all claims originally initiated as
grievances had to be processed through to arbitration, the system
would be woefully overburdened. 7 9
In view of the fact that the General Counsel of the NLRB has char-
acterized the unfair labor practice procedures as secondary to the arbitra-
tion process,S0 such a view is patently inconsistent. Furthermore, the
Court speaks of unburdening the arbitral process. Since the Board is itself
overwhelmed with cases,St it is curious that the Board should be extending
its services to remedial processes which, according to legislative and case
history properly belong to the arbitrator.
C & C Plywood
C & C Plywood differs from Acme Industrial, its companion case, in
that the Board's determination in C & C Plywood, that the employer had
no contractual right to institute a premium pay plan, was a determination
on the merits.
In C & C Plywood the Respondent was charged with having violated Sec-
tion 8 (a) (5) and (1) by unilaterally instituting a premium pay plan during
the term of a collective agreement, without prior consultation with the
union representative. The resultant order was to cease and desist, direct-
ing Respondent to bargain with the union and to rescind the previously
instituted premium plan. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
refused enforcement of the order, however, on the grounds that the pro-
79 Id.
80 See pp. 96-97 supra.
81 One of the most pressing and challenging problems facing the National Labor
Relations Board in recent years, and particularly since 1958, has been the greatly
increasing pressure of a burgeoning case load which has set new records each
year since 1961. Thus, in fiscal year 1966, combined representation and unfair
labor cases reached an all-time high of 28,993 cases- 3.5 percent higher than
FY 1965 and a 73 percent increase over FY 1958.
Address by Mr. Arnold Ordman, Feb. 27, 1967, 64 LAB. REL. REP. 181.
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vision in the contract "arguably" allowed such action by the employer.8 2
Thus, said the Court of Appeals, the Board was divested of jurisdiction
to entertain the unfair labor practice charge. In refusing to enforce the
Board's order, however, the Court of Appeals did not hold that the pro-
visions of the agreement had been misinterpreted by the Board. Rather,
it held the Board had exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that Respondent
had violated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act because:
. . . the existence . . . of an unfair labor practice does not turn
entirely upon the provisions of the Act, but arguably upon a good-
faith dispute as to the correct meaning of the provisions of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. .. 3
The decision is consistent with the policy established in Lincoln Mills
and the guidelines set down in Adams Dairy. Given a case which turns
entirely upon the provisions of a contract clause, the Board should with-
hold the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court reversed, nine to nothing. It held that in neces-
sarily construing a labor agreement to decide the unfair labor practice
case, the Board had not exceeded its jurisdiction as laid down by Con-
gress. The difficulty lies in the relationship of the unfair labor practice
to the contract clause. Were the unfair labor practice present irrespective
of the contract clause, there would be no jurisdictional problem.8 4 The
unfair labor practice, however, was dependent for its existence upon the
interpretation of the agreement. Thus, the entire case revolves around the
Board's initial examination and interpretation of the clause in question.
Respondent argued that since there was a clause in the contract which
might have allowed him to go to arbitration, the Board was powerless to
determine whether in fact that provision did authorize the unilateral
action. The question, argued Respondent, was one for a state or Federal
court under Section 301.
The Supreme Court responded by indicating that the absence of an
arbitration clause meant that the end result of the grievance procedures,
S2 The provision, Article XVII, read as follows:
A. A classified wage scale has been agreed upon by the Employer and the
Union, and has been signed by the parties and thereby made a part of the
written agreement.
The Employer reserves the right to pay a premium rate over and
above the contractual classified wage rate to reward any particular employee
for some special fitness, skill, aptitude or the like. The payment of such
premium rate shall not be considered a permanent increase in the rate of
that position and may, at the sole option of the Employer, be reduced to the
contractual rate ....
83 NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 351 F.2d 224, 228 (9th Cir. 1965).
84 The fact that a contract remedy exists in the courts (or that arbitration may be




"if differences between the parties remained unresolved, was economic
warfare, not the 'therapy of arbitration.' "85 Hence, the Board's action
was not inconsistent with its previous recognition of arbitration as "an
instrument of national labor policy for composing contractual differ-
ences." 8 6
Respondent further argued that the legislative history of the 1947
amendments to the Act supported its contention that the Board should
refuse to exercise its juridsiction. The Court, however, disagreed: "It is
said that the rejection by Congress of a bill which would have given the
Board unfair labor practice jurisdiction over all breaches of collective
bargaining agreements shows that the Board is without power to decide
any case involving the interpretation of a labor contract. We do not
draw that inference from this legislative history."s7 Admitting that the
Board should not have general jurisdiction over all alleged contract viola-
tions arising out of ambiguous provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement,8 8 the Court maintained that in this case, the Board did not
construe a labor agreement to determine the extent of the contractual
rights given the union. The Court said of the Board's action:
It has not imposed its own view of what the terms and conditions
of the labor agreement should be. It has done no more than merely
enforce a statutory right which Congress considered necessary to
allow labor and management to get on with the process of reaching
fair terms and conditions of employment-'to provide a means by
which agreement may be reached.' The Board's interpretation went
only so far as was necessary to determine that the union did not
agree to give up these statutory safeguards.8 9
Thus, the Supreme Court employed in C & C Plywood the "threshold
determination" argument which it used in Acme Industrial and held that
this was a warranted exercise of Board authority.
Finally, the Supreme Court argued that the Board's assertion of juris-
diction was justified by expediency, citing some of the problems involved
in the alternative of not going before the Board. The Court mentioned
the inordinate delays that labor organizations would face were they not
able to go before the Board in cases like this, where there was no arbi-
tration procedure provided for in the agreement. 90
Policy dictates that the Board should not be in the business of enforcing
85 C & C Plywood, 385 U.S. at 426.
86 See International Harvester Co. supra, p. 98.
87 C & C Plywood at 427.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 428.
90 "[Tlhe union would have to institute a court action to determine the applicability
of the premium pay provision of the collective bargaining agreement. If it
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labor contracts. Yet, according to the Court, the Board has a green light
to do so whenever there are "obstacles" the existence of which Congress
could not have intended. One must then ask: Given a situation involving
an alleged unfair labor practice and a disputed contract provision-is
there any case which will be material solely for the courts, and not for
the Board? According to the Supreme Court's opinion in C & C Plywood,
there is not, and the opinion therefore appears to fly in the face of strong
national policy favoring private resolution of contractual difficulties.
But C & C Plywood is a special case. In order to give the case a fair
reading, it is necessary to examine those circumstances that set this case
apart from others.
The Lack of an Arbitration Clause in C & C
How meaningful is the lack of an arbitration clause here? The Court
initiated its discussion of the case by pointing out the absence of such a
clause, and by its reference"' to the lower court's citation of Square D
Co. v. NLRB,92 hinted strongly that had there been an arbitration clause,
the decision might have been different. In Square D the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that the Board had no jurisdiction over cases
involving alleged unilateral changes of wages, hours or terms or condi-
tions of employment where " . . . the existence of an unfair labor practice
• . . is dependent upon the resolution of a preliminary dispute involving
only a question of interpretation of the contract."93 The problem here is
that it is impossible to predict the outcome of a Square D case before
the Supreme Court, particularly in light of Acme Industrial. The
contract in Acme provided for compulsory arbitration, but the Court
rejected the concept that in the presence of such a clause, an arbitrator's
determination would be prerequisite to the union's rights under Section
8(a) (5).
Earlier in this discussion, the possible waiver effects of an arbitration
clause Were examined. In C & C Plywood, there was no arbitration clause,
and in Square D there was. In the former case, the parties did not have
to go to arbitration, and in the latter they did. But, as Acme Industrial
readily shows, this is not conclusive evidence that the arbitration clause
is the key factor. The decision concerning jurisdiction in each case turns
on several factors, the most important of which are included in this chart;
succeeded in court, the union would have to go back to the Labor Board to
begin an unfair labor practice proceeding. It is not unlikely that this would add
years to the already lengthy period required to gain relief from the Board.
Congress cannot have intended to place such obstacles in the way of the Board's
effective enforcement of statutory duties. For in the labor field, as in few others,
time is crucially important in obtaining relief." C & C Plywood at 429-30.
91 C & C Plywood at 426.
92 332 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964).
93 Id. at 365-66.
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Acme Industrial C & C Square D
Arbitration
Clause? Yes No Yes
Possibility
of Waiver? Yes No Yes
Necessity to
Interpret Contract
to find ULP? No Yes Yes
Board Jurisdiction? Yes Yes No
The conclusions which may be drawn from the chart are as follows:
In C & C Plywood there was no arbitration clause, while there was one
in Square D. The chance of expressing a waiver of statutory rights was
present, therefore, in Square D, but not in C & C Plywood. In both cases,
it was necessary to interpret a clause in the contract in order to find if an
unfair labor practice existed. The reasoning behind approving Board juris-
diction in C & C Plywood but not in Square D could then be seen as an
emanation of the following accepted labor policy: In the case where inter-
pretation of a contract clause is necessary, it should be handled by an
arbitrator if possible. In Square D, there was this possibility, but in C & C
Plywood, there was not. Indeed, as the Supreme Court pointed out, the
alternative to the Board's asserting its jurisdiction was "economic warfare",
not the "therapy of arbitration." 94 Whereas a contract with an arbitration
clause provides for a third party decision, one lacking such clause is
essentially unchanneled, and in this situation, the concept of Board inter-
vention can be more easily reconciled.
In Acme Industrial, there was an arbitration clause and thus the pos-
sibility of waiver, but here there was no need for any preliminary inter-
pretation of the contract to find the unfair labor practice. The Supreme
Court said:
There can be no question of the general obligation of an employer
to provide information that is needed by the bargaining representa-
tive for the proper performance of its duties .... The only real issue
in this case, therefore, is whether the Board must await an arbitrator's
determination of the relevancy of the requested information before
it can enforce the union's statutory rights under Section 8(a)(5).
(Emphasis added.)95
Attractive as this reasoning may be for the moment, we shall see in
Huttig96 that we cannot depend on it, and it is thus necessary to look
to other factors in C & C Plywood responsible for the decision.
94 C & C Plywood at 426.
95 Id. at 435-36.
96 See p. 113 infra.
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The Nature of the Breach
As mentioned before, C & C Plywood is a special case, and factual
changes could easily have affected its outcome. For instance, had the breach
itself been of a different nature, the decision might have been different.
The breach here was the institution by the employer of a change in the
pay plan. The Court of Appeals took the view expressed in Jacobs
Manufacturing Co.S)T that if the parties have bargained about any matter
and discussed or incorporated it into the agreement, then during the con-
tract term, there is no further obligation to bargain. The duty to bargain
is thus exhausted and the complainants are left only with their contract
rights, which are matters for the courts, not the Board. However, the
Board views a unilateral change in working conditions as an unfair labor
practice regardless of the terms of a contract. In other words, the nature
of the 8(a) (5) violation is particularly heinous in the Board's view, and
such action could conceivably lead the Board to disregard the possibility
of other modes of settlement, whereas a different type of Section 8 viola-
tion might not. Furthermore, the type of change instituted was wide-
sweeping in effect, and as opposed to affecting just one employee or two,
could have had significant effects on the entire working force.
The Nature of the "Injury"
With the possible exception of damage done to the bargaining agent's
pride and status, there was no real injury in C & C Plywood. Indeed, the
employees benefitted financially. What the union was fighting for was its
power and prestige as a bargaining agent; but while the Board would have
no difficulty in issuing an order to honor the contract, as it did in Hyde's
Super Market,9 s a court might have had difficulty fashioning a remedy
in the absence of damages arising from the breach of contract. Thus, had
the employer's action inflicted real injury on the employees, as in the
case of a diminution of wages, a court would have had no trouble award-
ing damages as a remedy, and the Board, therefore, might have been less
likely to assert jurisdiction.
The importance of these peculiar facts is uncertain. No one can predict
with any degree of certainty the outcome of the same case with minor
factual variations, particularly since the Courts of Appeals and the Board
have split on such fundamental issues as the value of arbitration or the
obligation to bargain further over contract material. In giving the Board
jurisdiction on the unfair labor practice cases, C & C Plywood discounted
the interpretive problem and Acme ignored the arbitration clause. In light
of these cases, the best guess is that somehow a mixture of the two
elements might provide the key to the Board's decisions. But Huttig
9 7 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951).
9S See note 60 supra.
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Sash & Door Co.99 removes these last vestiges of hope. After Huttig
it is evident that neither an arbitration clause nor a contract interpreta-
tion nor a mixture of both factors will control the Board's reasoning.
Huttig
In Huttig the Board found that employer had violated Section 8(a) (5)
and (1) of the Act by unilaterally modifying the contract in mid-term
in spite of the union's objection and without following the prescribed
procedure specified in Section 8(d) and the agreement itself. It found
that the company's contention that the wage reduction was permitted by
contract "must fall in view of the plain and unambiguous provisions of
the contract." 100 Furthermore, it held that the complaint should not be
dismissed simply because Huttig's conduct could have been challenged
under the contract's grievance and arbitration procedure. In so holding,
it relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Acme Industrial and C & C
Plywood.
The Board decided, and the Court affirmed, that the employer had
not fulfilled his obligation to bargain, having unilaterally reduced certain
wages. The remaining issues in that case, factually similar to C & C
Plywood, were these:
1. Does the Board have jurisdiction to determine whether the em-
ployer was guilty of an unfair labor practice when, in so doing,
the Board is required to evaluate the employer's interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement?
2. Does the Board have unfair labor practice jurisdiction when the
contract provides for grievance procedures and arbitration?
The Issue of Board Jurisdiction in the Presence of
Contract Evaluation
The Huttig court recognized the logical inconsistency of emphasizing
in C & C Plywood the absence of an arbitration clause as a reason for
assuming jurisdiction, while specifying in Acme the wish to "unburden" the
arbitral process in the presence of that clause. Yet the court regarded
this inconsistency as:
... rendered meaningless . . . in what we regard as the other over-
riding and vital features of the two decisions, namely, that, of itself,
neither the presence of a problem of contract interpretation nor the
presence of an arbitration provision in the contract deprives the
Board of jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.) 10 1
99 377 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1967).
00 Id. at 966.
101 Id. at 969.
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The policy behind such Board actions, according to the court, was that
of expediting the entire labor dispute settlement process. Avoiding delay
either in the courts or in the arbitration process, emphasizing and pro-
tecting statutory rights- all these should take priority in the face of a
contract interpretation problem in "what is regarded as basically an unfair
labor practice dispute" or a "primary Board function under the Act". 10 2
The response to such arguments is obvious. Who is to decide what is
"basically" an unfair labor practice case and what is "primarily" a Board
function? There is no question but that the Board makes this decision,
and one is thus no closer to the answer than before. In eradicating any
possible effect of an interpretative problem on the question of Board
jurisdiction, Huttig takes one more step in creating a wide-open field
before the already crowded docket for the Labor Board.
The Issue of Board Jurisdiction in the Presence of a Contract
Provision for Grievance Procedure and Arbitration
Having decided that a contract interpretation problem would not stand
in the way of Board jurisdiction in this case, there was no problem for
the court to decide that an arbitration clause should not make any differ-
ence. Citing Smith v. Evening News Assn. 10 3 and Carey1 04 the Court said:
"There is no necessary or automatic mutual exclusiveness as between the
contract remedy and the unfair labor practice remedy."' 105 Although it
noted the lack of an arbitration clause in C & C Plywood and the
possibility of economic warfare were the parties left to their own devices,
the Huttig court discounted this factor as an overriding element in the
decision. "We feel," said the court, ". . . that this is only one factor in
the Court's decision and that it is not the pivotal factor."
Any concern one might have about the controlling significance of the
absence or presence of the arbitration provision, and thus of the
particular precedental authority of C & C Plywood here, is set at rest
or is at least alleviated, we think by the companion decision in Acme.
(Emphasis added.) 106
The "Spectrum Approach"
Huttig provides a package full of policy considerations which underlie
the problem of Board jurisdiction. In one paragraph' 0 7 the court
outlines the following rationales for Board jurisdiction:
021d, at 970.
103 See note 22 supra.
104 See note 4 supra.
105 Huttig, supra note 71 at 970.
106 Id. at 969.
107 Id. at 970.
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1. The need for avoiding inordinate delay in the recognition and
implementation of a labor organization's rights.
2. The same recognition that there may be more than one way to
settle a dispute.
3. The emphasis upon preserving rights statutorily expressed.
4. The obvious effectiveness of the Board remedy and the possible
need to obtain it anyway.
5. The emphasis, as expressed in Acme, on the Board's pre-eminent
jurisdiction under Section 10(a) of the Act.
6. The desirability of not rendering unavailable the Board's ex-
pertise in its traditional area.
All these considerations, said the Court, bear on the problem of juris-
diction and "prompt us to conclude that the presence of a contract
provision for both grievance procedure and arbitration does not eliminate
Board jurisdiction of an unfair labor practice charge in the present
context."l 0 8
There can be little doubt, then, that the Board will be able to take
jurisdiction of any unfair labor practice case. By virtue of Acme, C & C
Plywood, and finally Huttig, a contract interpretation problem is no longer
a roadblock to Board jurisdiction. Furthermore, there can no longer be any
doubt as to the effect (or lack of such) of an arbitration clause in an
agreement. These three cases present the Board with a wide range of
factors to take into consideration regarding jurisdiction. These elements,
like those listed above in Huttig, create a total picture that the Board will
view before deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction. The final question
is whether this "spectrum approach" should be the Board's method of
operation, and, if not, then what?
V. Conclusion: Practicality v. Logic
Recalling Member Brown's warning in Adams Dairy'0 9 the Board must
be cautious in the future lest the power of the arbitration clause and
indeed the strength of the private agreement be sapped by present far-
reaching boundaries of Board jurisdiction.
C & C Plywood, Acme and Huttig are all founded on strong legal logic.
They leave in their wake, however, precedent potentially destructive to
the very goals toward which they aspire. Instead of providing for in-
dustrial peace through private settlement, these cases present potential
disputants with the means, now more than ever, of circumventing national
policy favoring arbitration. If the Board is to refrain from the policing of
private agreements, then modifications in its policy will have to be made.
More consideration will have to be given not to whether the Board can
take jurisdiction in the individual case, for little doubt remains as to that
108 Id.
109 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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point, but rather whether it should. The question for the Board should
be whether or not the overall goal of industrial stability will be better
served by deferring to the arbitral process. I shall attempt in this section
not to propose a new set of standards for the Board, but rather a hierarchy
of some of the value considerations used in defining Board jurisdiction
in the individual cases.
The Nature of the Breach
Under the principles enunciated in A dams Dairy, Smith Cabinet, Huttig,
Century Papers and C & S Industries, it is apparent that the Board will
not defer if it concludes either that (1) contract issue is insubstantial or
(2) the case involves a matter central to the system of collective
bargaining established by the Act and requiring the application of prin-
ciples developed under the Act and not merely traditional principles of
contract interpretation. On the other hand, the Board has indicated it
will defer in circumstances where challenged conduct is not particularly
dangerous to the collective bargaining process and where the arbitration
process will clear up the contract dispute and the unfair labor practice
charge. 11 0
The primary concern in the question of jurisdiction, then, is the nature
of the breach. In other words, how serious is the alleged improper con-
duct? If the conduct is of a nature subversive to the basic principles of
collective bargaining, then the Board has indicated it will take jurisdiction,
regardless of privately agreed-upon remedies.11 The key to this question
is: What is subversive to the principles of collective bargaining? The
Board views any delay or cost in exercising remedial measures as sub-
versive, thus justifying its assumption of jurisdiction in the face of an
arbitration clause. But this remedial course ignores any concept of pre-
vention, and does so at the expense of the private agreement. We have
seen that there are unfair labor practices so flagrant and potentially
dangerous, (particularly in regard to 8(a)(5) violations) that any re-
110 Address by Mr. Ordman, note 81 supra.
111 Likewise, if but for Board jurisdiction, there would be no ready solution to the
breach, the Board should take the case. This is where C & C Plywood fits in.
There, the union's alternative would be to have gone to court. Speaking for the
Supreme Court, Justice Stewart pointed out the difficulty in establishing a basis
for recovery. He said:
The precise nature of the union's case in court is not readily apparent. If
damages for breach of contract were sought, the union would have diffi-
culty in establishing the amount of injury caused by respondent's actions.
For the real injury in this case is to the union's status as bargaining
representative, and it would be difficult to translate such damage into dollars
and cents. C & C Plywood at 429 n. 15.
On the other hand, Justice Stewart noted that an injunction might be barred by




medial action should not be forestalled by the contract; but the justifica-
tion for action in these cases should not be extended to cover all situations.
The Agreement of the Parties
After having disposed of those cases that must, by nature of the breach
involved, go to the Board, one must look to the nature of the contract.
While we may grant that parties should not be penalized because of some
lapse in their thinking in drawing up the contracts, the line between
paternalism and policing is far too thin to let the Board be a corrective
agency for mis-made agreements. There is no doubt, for instance, that
the policies espoused in Huttig are valid and admirable ones. However,
should the desirability of not rendering the Board's "expertise" unavailable
outweigh an agreement by the parties to go to arbitration? Indeed, as
stated in the Warrior and Gulf case,1 12 the labor arbitrator has a degree
of expertise which may be unavailable to the Board.
It is true that arbitrators differ in qualityl13 and that bad bargains
may be entered into, but prospective fear of this should not be enough
to effectively deny the arbitration procedure. In fact, should an arbitra-
tion settlement be repugnant to the policies of the Act, the principles
established in Spielbergt14 will take care of the problem, for the Board
will be able to modify or reverse the resultant order.
While it must be admitted, then, that public policy is not always best
served by saying, "you made your bed, now lie in it," one must heed
Board Member Brown's warning in Adams Dairyt 15 that the strength of
the contract itself is dependent on the Board's careful exercise of their
preemptive powers.
If the value of the individual agreement is to be preserved, then, cases
112 363 U.S. 574 (1960). The Court stated, at 576:
The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express provisions of
the contract, as the industrial common law - the practices of the industry and
the shop - is equally part of the collective bargaining agreement although not
expressed in it. The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties'
confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in
his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed
in the contract as criteria for judgment .... For the parties' objective in using
the arbitration process is primarily to further their common goal of interrupted
production under their ageement, to make the ageement serve their specialized
needs. The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and
competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot
be similarly informed.
113 "[I]t has not been possible for the Board to find that all arbitrators are as wise as
Solomon, or as just. And being chosen for a term of years or life, arbitrators do not
always have, nor need they have, the perspective of members of the judiciary or of
a quasi-judicial agency such as the NLRB." Harris, The National Labor Relations
Board and Arbitration - The Battle of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 16 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 545 (1961).
114 See note 44 supra.
115 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
April 19681
Prospectus
articulating a national policy favoring arbitration such as the Steelworkers
will have to be brought to the fore. 1 16 Brown's concurring opinion in
Adams Dairy, expressing the necessity of greater faith in the contract
itself, must become a model for the majority opinions of the Board. If
such a trend is to be established, cases like Acme Industrial will have
to undergo serious re-examination. A cme is an example of legal logic
overwhelming any concept of practicality. Not only was there a binding
arbitration clause in the contract, but the court admitted that an employer
should supply the requested information. The Supreme Court characterized
the Board's action as a "threshold determination" and justified jurisdiction
on these grounds. But this does not change the fact that the intent of
the parties at the time of contracting was thus disregarded and made
virtually meaningless. Admitting that there was no harm done in this
case, the question remains as to the strength of the next contract.
Furthermore, the Board's effort to "aid the arbitral process" in these
cases seem at best to be misguided energy in view of the tremendous
case load before the Board today. In retrospect, the Acme decision is
questionable because it enables, for example, the Huttig court to pro-
claim 117 that neither the presence nor absence of an arbitration clause
will have any controlling significance on the question of Board jurisdiction.
Surely this is contrary to the principles of the Steelworkers cases and to
the overall goal of industrial peace as expressed in the Act itself. To this
extent, Huttig, too, must be re-examined for while no one can base the
"final word" on an arbitration clause by itself, such a provision must be
elevated to a higher level of importance.
Conclusion
If the unfair labor practice is to truly remain a "subordinate activity",
then the whole focus demonstrated by the most recent cases must change.
Considerations such as time and money, as well as those factors expressed
in Huttig, are still vitally important to the labor field. Resolution of in-
dustrial disputes is generally a more time consuming, thus a more expensive
process when handled by the Labor Board. Moreover, the solidity of
future agreements, or at least the care with which they are drawn, rests on
giving weight to contracted-for remedial methods.
The emphasis must, in the future, be on requiring parties to resolve
their problems through the machinery established by agreement. This
responsibility rests directly with the Board, for only by requiring adherence
to contractually agreed-upon settlement methods will it "promote a higher
degree of responsibility upon the parties to such agreements, and thereby
promote industrial peace."18
116 While it is admitted that the Steelworkers cases do not apply to an arbitrator-Board
relationship, there can be no doubt that the policy expressed therein does apply.
117 See p. 114 supra.
118 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454 (1957).
